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Abstract 
This study examines when ‘incremental’ change is likely to trigger ‘discontinuous’ change, using 
the lens of complex adaptive systems theory. Going beyond the simulations and case studies 
through which complex adaptive systems have been approached so far, we study the relationship 
between incremental organizational reconfigurations and discontinuous organizational 
restructurings using a large-scale database of U.S. Fortune 50 industrial corporations. We 
develop two types of escalation process in organizations: accumulation and perturbation. Under 
ordinary conditions, it is perturbation rather than the accumulation that is more likely to trigger 
subsequent discontinuous change. However, organizations are more sensitive to both 
accumulation and perturbation in conditions of heightened disequilibrium. Contrary to 
expectations, highly interconnected organizations are not more liable to discontinuous change. 
We conclude with implications for further research, especially the need to attend to the potential 
role of managerial design and coping when transferring complex adaptive systems theory from 
natural systems to organizational systems.  
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Change Escalation Processes and Complex Adaptive Systems: from Incremental 
Reconfigurations to Discontinuous Restructuring 
 
 
Introduction 
Organization theorists often discuss change in terms of contrasting types, with different levels of 
impact: for example, evolutionary change and revolutionary change (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996); continuous and episodic change (Weick & Quinn, 1999); and incremental and 
discontinuous change (Nadler & Tushman, 1995). The contrasts are useful in highlighting the 
distinct managerial implications of each type of change. However, the types are not necessarily 
discrete and well-insulated alternatives: one type of change can lead to another. Weick and 
Quinn (1999: 378) invoke complex adaptive systems theory: under certain conditions 'small 
changes do not stay small... Small changes can be decisive if they occur at the edge of chaos.’  
This article explores how organizations may tip over the edge from incremental to 
discontinuous change (Nadler & Tushman, 1995). We adopt the lens of complex adaptive 
systems theory, associated with the edge of chaos (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). Originally 
developed in the natural sciences to describe the behavior of phenomena ranging from weather 
patterns to biological populations, complex adaptive systems theory points to how natural 
systems tend to balance on a dynamic edge between inertia and ‘chaotic’ change.  This edge is 
characterized by ongoing adaptive change. But beyond a threshold, otherwise adaptive changes 
can tip systems beyond continuity into radical change. In this sense, small changes have 
disproportionate - 'nonlinear' - effects (Miller & Page, 2007).  
We adopt the lens of complex adaptive systems theory as a coherent metaphorical 
framework by which to detect and interpret nonlinear effects in organizations equivalent to those 
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in nature (Richardson, 2011). Taking a complex adaptive systems lens alerts us to the potential 
for incremental change to escalate to discontinuous change. Moreover, it points us to two distinct 
types of change escalation process: i. accumulation, where escalation is a result of progressively 
building pressures; and ii. perturbation, where escalation is the result of discrete system shocks. 
Complex adaptive systems theorists are beginning to study nonlinear change in organizations 
using simulations (Carroll & Burton, 2000; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009) and individual 
case studies (e.g., Chiles, Meyer, & Hench, 2004; Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Plowman, Baker, 
Beck, Kulkarni, Thomas-Solansky, & Villareal-Travis, 2007). However, empirical studies of 
complex adaptive systems effects in organizations are still rare (Andriani & McKelvey, 2009; 
Eoyang, 2011). In particular, we do not have large scale cross-industry research on how 
incremental change may escalate into discontinuous change. As a result, we lack systematic 
evidence about organizations’ susceptibility to escalation and when it is more likely.  
 Accordingly, this study explores the relationship between incremental change and 
discontinuous change in a large sample of U.S. Fortune 50 industrial corporations between 1989 
and 2004. We focus on organizational restructuring as a form of discontinuous change and 
organizational reconfiguration as a form of incremental change. By organizational restructuring, 
we mean change in basic structural principles, for example change in the type of structural axes 
or the number of organizational layers (Bowman, Singh, Useem, & Bhadury, 1999). By 
reconfiguration, we mean changes affecting particular structural units, for instance mergers or 
splits, but which leave the overall organization structure basically intact (Eisenhardt & Brown, 
1999; Karim, 2006). Reconfigurations are thus incremental in Nadler and Tushman’s (1995) 
sense of being consistent with existing structural principles, while restructuring is discontinuous 
in that it involves change in structural principles.  
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Escalation from reconfiguration to restructuring may have significant implications. 
Whereas reconfigurations are the kinds of change that can become relatively routinized in 
organizations (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999), discontinuous change is typically more episodic and 
requires different managerial skills (Weick and Quinn, 1999).  Discontinuous change can be 
painful, risky and difficult (Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986; Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996). In particular, restructurings are associated with performance penalties, at least in the 
short-term (Lamont, Robert, & Hoffman, 1994). Moreover, especially from a repetitive 
momentum perspective (Amburgey and Miner, 1992), escalation may be unexpected.  Given the 
potential for trauma and surprise, organizations need to know more about whether and when 
incremental change may escalate to a higher level.  
Our study makes several contributions. Above all, we show for the first time in a large 
group of organizations that incremental change in the form of reconfigurations does predict 
subsequent discontinuous change in the form of restructuring, in line with complex adaptive 
systems theory. Change produces greater change. Further, we find that perturbations rather than 
accumulations of incremental change are more likely to trigger discontinuous change. We 
identify a point where the rate of incremental change is markedly more likely to produce 
discontinuous change, and indicate conditions where such escalation is more likely. We find that 
organizations in disequilibrium are more sensitive to the triggering effects of incremental 
change, and that this applies to accumulation as well as perturbation. But, contrary to 
expectations from complex adaptive systems theory, we do not find that greater 
interconnectedness in organizations increases the likelihood of discontinuous restructuring 
following reconfigurations. We suggest that human organizations may differ from natural 
systems in two respects therefore: their apparent ability to cope with the ordinary accumulation 
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of incremental change and their lack of sensitivity to interconnectedness. In these respects, our 
results support McLean & McIntosh (2011) in pointing to the possible role of management in 
mediating the effects of complex adaptive systems in organizations.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
This section introduces restructuring and reconfiguration as types of, respectively, discontinuous 
and incremental change. We continue by examining theoretical and case study treatments of 
change from a complex adaptive systems perspective, and the conditions under which they 
suggest escalation from incremental to discontinuous change is more likely. 
 
Discontinuous restructuring and incremental reconfiguration  
Weick and Quinn (1999) take as an example of discontinuous change the occasional 
‘revolutions’ of punctuated equilibrium theory, characterized by changes in organizational 
leadership, strategy and structure (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Discontinuity involves a 
qualitative change of state and is typically infrequent. We follow Nadler and Tushman (1995) in 
taking restructuring as our focal type of ‘discontinuous’ change: organizations move from one 
basic organization structure to another.  Restructurings involve change in the number of 
organizational layers and/or change in the number or type of structural axes, for instance from 
functional to divisional axes (Bowman, Singh, Useem, & Bhadury, 1999). Examples from our 
data include Compaq's removal of a whole layer of executive vice presidents in 2000 and 
ExxonMobil’s 1999 shift from a geographic divisional structure to a global divisional structure.  
Thus restructurings are discontinuous in that the basic structure of reporting relationships is 
fundamentally changed organization-wide. Such restructurings are generally occasional: 
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strategy-structure misfits often endure a decade or more (Aupperle, Acar and Mukherjee, 2013). 
Even if necessary, discontinuous restructurings can be highly disruptive and ‘painful’ (Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1996). In punctuated equilibrium theory, restructurings are typically accompanied 
by radical and traumatic changes in strategy and leadership as well (Romanelli and Tushman, 
1994). Restructurings may also incur short-term performance penalties, as in adoptions of the M-
form structure (Lamont, Robert, & Hoffman, 1994).  
Weick and Quinn (1999) contrast such discontinuous change with the ongoing 
incremental change found in Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) fast-evolving computer companies, 
which Eisenhardt later describes as reconfigurations (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999; Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 2001). Reconfigurations involve small adjustments within the same basic structure, 
namely the adding, splitting, transferring, merging or deleting of particular organizational units. 
Changes in reporting relationships are localized rather than organization-wide. Eisenhardt and 
Brown (1999) give the example of Dell’s regular divisional splits, which reconfigure particular 
businesses while leaving the company's basic customer-division structure intact. 
Reconfigurations are increasingly recognized as important for dynamic capabilities (Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 2001), learning and innovation (Karim, 2009), the divestment and retention of 
activities (Karim, 2012), and the flow of knowledge within firms (Karim and Williams, 2012). 
These reconfigurations entail more limited adjustments than restructurings and, because of their 
frequency, can become fluent organizational routines (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999). Such 
reconfigurations are often what Tushman et al (1986: 587) term figuratively ‘ten percent 
changes,’ expected and potentially welcomed even in conservative organizations. 
While the literatures on both restructuring and reconfiguration are well-developed in 
themselves, potential relationships between these two forms of organizational change have not 
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been considered. This disarticulation appears also in more general treatments of types of change 
in organization theory. In punctuated equilibrium theory, for example, equilibria are typically 
punctuated by occasional episodes of radical, brief and pervasive transformations (Romanelli and 
Tushman, 1994). Small organizational changes do not accumulate to generate larger 
transformations therefore. Similarly, in the organizational momentum perspective, one type of 
change typically does not unfreeze the organization as a whole, but only unfreezes the same type 
of change (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991: 606). Institutionalization and routinization processes 
ensure that the more frequent a particular kind of change, the more probable is its reoccurrence 
(Amburgey et al, 1993): there is repetitive momentum in firms’ choices of alliance partners, for 
example (Gulati, 1995). Momentum implies that changes repeat rather than escalate to another 
level. A still stronger view on the relationship between episodes of change is that successful 
adaptation in one part of an organization can even reduce pressure for adaptations elsewhere 
(Levinthal and March, 1993).  This safety-valve effect suggests that incremental change may 
actually diminish the chance of more change. Ilinitch et al (1996: 218) propose that ongoing 
adaptive (incremental) change may substitute for major episodic change. Thus, from several 
points of view, reconfiguration is thought unlikely to lead to subsequent restructuring. Complex 
adaptive systems theory suggests the reverse: reconfigurations can trigger restructuring.  
 
Complex adaptive systems theory and change 
Organization theorists drawing on complex adaptive systems theory are particularly sensitive to 
how feedback processes can amplify small change into larger change (Van de Ven and Poole, 
1995; Weick & Quinn, 1999). Many systems operate on a dynamic but precarious ‘edge of 
chaos’, neither inert nor wholly disordered (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Carroll and Burton, 
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2000). This edge of chaos involves a typically fragile balance between different kinds of 
feedback, positive and negative. Positive feedback amplifies change, as when panic spreads 
through a herd to cause a stampede.  Negative feedback dampens change, as when the release of 
insulin corrects excesses of glucose in the human body. Where positive feedback exceeds some 
critical threshold value, equivalent to a ‘tipping point’ (Neptstad et al, 2008), systems are pushed 
beyond the ordinarily dynamic edge of chaos and into the chaotic zone of heightened instability. 
Thus otherwise innocuous small events may trigger so-called 'large events', phenomena of an 
altogether different scale and character to what preceded them (Miller & Page, 2007).  
We can draw from complex adaptive systems theory two distinct processes for such 
nonlinear change, differing according to the pattern of preceding events and the timing of 
outcomes. The first escalation process is one of progressive accumulation, by which the build-up 
of small changes finally creates insupportable pressures that explode into a greater event. The 
initial pattern of change may be incremental and slow, but, when positive feedback finally 
overwhelms restraining forces, the outcome is large and sudden. In complex adaptive systems 
theory, this process is the kind of avalanche event that eventually results from the repeated 
dropping of individual grains of sand on a sand-pile (Bak and Paczuski, 1995). Even if the 
pattern is steady and incremental, just one extra grain of sand can finally push the sand-pile over 
the edge with disproportionately explosive results - an avalanche. As illustration, Plowman et al's 
(2007: 536) case study of turnaround within a church describes ‘an accumulation of small 
changes that ultimately became radical’: positive feedback amplified a series of small volunteer 
initiatives over several years into unforeseen and fundamental change. 
The second escalation process is set off by discrete perturbation rather than progressive 
accumulation. Here a quite small event may trigger knock-on effects that reverberate throughout 
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the system with growing amplitude until eventually precipitating major change. Each part of the 
system transmits the initial perturbation to the next part, generating increasing waves of positive 
feedback to a point where damping by negative feedback is no longer enough to constrain large-
scale repercussions. In complex adaptive systems theory, an extreme example of this kind of 
perturbation is the famous butterfly effect: here the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil can 
notionally set off a chain of events leading to a tornado in Texas (Lorenz, 1993). Thus one kind 
of event, even small and remote, can spark other events that lead to an outcome of much larger 
scale and far distant from the original. Characterized by bursts of activity, the perturbation 
process has a more uneven preceding pattern of change than the accumulation process, and the 
gap between trigger and outcomes is longer. Case studies illustrate this uneven and lagged 
perturbation process too. Thus Chiles et al (2004: 502)  describe how Branson, Missouri’s 
development process was one of occasional perturbatory events (e.g. the improvement of the 
railroad), where ‘evolution proceeds from one punctuated emergence to the next’. Each 
perturbation opened up mindsets, unleashing waves of new initiatives which eventually 
consolidated into new orders for the growing town.  The sequence from initial perturbation to 
consolidation would typically take several years. At Intel, Burgelman and Grove (2007: 278) 
point to a similar two-step process summarized by the aphorism: ‘Let chaos reign, then rein in 
chaos’. The process begins with initial perturbatory bursts of ‘autonomous’ local initiatives in 
middle management layers and the periphery. Only after a period of analysis and debate would 
top management take the second step, and scale up the most promising local initiatives into 
coordinated programs of major ‘induced’ change. 
 While such case studies of a church, a town and a technology leader can illustrate 
nonlinear escalation processes, they provide insecure grounds for generalization. Moreover, 
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these cases differ in the weights given to progressive accumulation and discrete perturbation.  
Our initial hypotheses therefore follow complex adaptive systems logic by using a large sample 
to test the extent to which incremental reconfigurations may have nonlinear effects in the form of 
discontinuous restructurings. The hypotheses distinguish between the two escalation processes, 
accumulation and perturbation:  
Hypothesis 1a: The greater the accumulated incremental change (reconfigurations) since a 
previous discontinuous change (restructuring), the higher the likelihood of subsequent 
discontinuous change (restructurings). 
Hypothesis 1b: The more incremental change (reconfigurations) is concentrated in short 
periods of time, the higher the likelihood of subsequent discontinuous change (restructurings). 
 
Moderating effects of disequilibrium and interconnectedness 
Complex adaptive systems theory also proposes two conditions under which incremental change 
is more likely to lead to discontinuous change: internal disequilibrium and system 
interconnectedness.  These conditions are already recognized within organization theory as 
having a role in change, but complex adaptive systems integrates them within a single frame.  
Prigogine (1978) observes that physical systems tend to behave differently as they move 
from equilibrium (or close to equilibrium) to disequilibrium. Beyond a critical value, damping 
processes are likely to be overwhelmed by additional disturbances from which new kinds of 
order may emerge. If pressures are already high or rising in the system, any particular change is 
more liable to breach the critical threshold beyond which large events become likely (Andriani & 
McKelvey, 2009). In other words, systems operating in a state of heightened disequilibrium are 
closer to the chaotic state where they are exposed to discontinuous change.   
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Within organization theory, Plowman et al (2007) take the complex adaptive systems lens 
to highlight two disequilibriating factors that precipitated transformation at their church: change 
in leadership and performance decline. Organization theorists from other traditions recognize the 
importance of similar factors for significant organizational change. Thus, researchers on CEO 
succession observe that new leaders, especially outsiders, are more likely to institute radical 
change (Miller, 1993). Similarly, both absolute and relative performance decline increases the 
pressure for organizational change (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Barker & Duhaime, 1997). 
Downturns in organizational growth are especially likely to prompt changes in organization form 
(Huber, Sutcliffe, Miller, & Glick, 1995). In short, both top management change and 
performance decline appear to create conditions where firms are easily pushed beyond the 
ordinary dynamism characteristic of the edge of chaos into the more extreme chaotic conditions 
from which discontinuous change may emerge. To test the effects of disequilibrium on 
accumulation and perturbation, we therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a: The more an organization is characterized by organizational decline, the 
more cumulated incremental change (reconfigurations) will be associated with subsequent 
discontinuous change (restructurings). 
Hypothesis 2b: The more an organization is characterized by organizational decline, the 
more concentrated bursts of incremental change (reconfigurations) will be associated with 
subsequent discontinuous change (restructurings).  
Hypothesis 3a: The more an organization is characterized by top management change, the 
more cumulated incremental change (reconfigurations) will be associated with subsequent 
discontinuous change (restructurings). 
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Hypothesis 3b: The more an organization is characterized by top management change, the 
more concentrated bursts of incremental change (reconfigurations) will be associated with 
subsequent discontinuous change (restructurings). 
A second condition exacerbating susceptibility to discontinuous change is internal 
connectedness. Complex adaptive systems theory highlights how natural systems are more 
fragile when highly interconnected internally (Kauffman, 1993). Connections allow surges in 
positive feedback to be easily transmitted throughout the whole system, with low buffering 
between individual parts. The multiplier effects of change increase with growing 
interconnectedness (Dooley, 1997). From within organization theory, Weick’s (1976) notion of 
loose-coupling supports the advantage of limited interconnectedness within organizations. 
Loose-coupling promotes flexibility and buffers the impact of organizational shocks; tight-
coupling restricts flexibility and allows local shocks to reverberate throughout the whole system.  
Similarly, in both configuration theory (Miller, 1982) and complementarities theory 
(Whittington, Pettigrew, Peck, Fenton, & Conyon, 1999), tight interconnectedness transmits the 
impact of localized incremental changes much more widely through the organization. Isolated 
changes and repairs can violate organizational complementarities and unravel the whole bundle 
of mutually-supporting elements (Zenger, 2002).  
 Organizational interconnectedness varies by strategy. Unrelated conglomerate strategies 
leave each business unit operating in distinct markets and managed independently: units are 
well-insulated from shocks to any particular one (Kay, 2000). In conglomerates, 
interconnectedness is low and change can be localized. In undiversified or related-diversified 
firms, by contrast, resource-sharing and market-adjacencies are higher, creating more links 
across organizational units through which shocks can be transmitted organization-wide (Rumelt, 
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1974). The more related a firm’s strategy, therefore, the more prone it should be to nonlinear 
change. These arguments about strategic interconnectedness lead to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4a: The more highly interconnected organizations are strategically, the more 
cumulated incremental change (reconfigurations) will be associated with subsequent 
discontinuous change (restructurings). 
Hypothesis 4b: The more highly interconnected organizations are strategically, the more 
concentrated bursts of incremental change (reconfigurations) will be associated with 
subsequent discontinuous change (restructurings). 
 
Research Methodology 
We focus on reconfigurations and restructurings because these offer two standard and 
comparable forms of organizational change that are distinct in nature and scope, while lending 
themselves to quantitative measurement. We illustrate incremental reconfiguration and 
discontinuous restructuring by particular reference to Ford, a company in which we interviewed 
and whose products are widely familiar.  
 
Sample and study period  
We take as our sample the top 50 publicly-listed industrial firms ranked in 1985 in the U.S. 
Fortune 500, tracking them through until 2004 (13 dropped from the sample due to takeover). 
These firms are of similar size to Intel, the major existing case study of complex adaptive change 
in a large-scale corporate context (Burgelman and Grove, 2007). They are also large enough to 
receive extensive media coverage, thereby enabling the comparison of multiple sources of 
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information. The timeframe allows us to track firms through multiple iterations of change, with 
extended lags.  All data are assigned by financial year.  
 
Dependent variable: organizational restructuring 
Consistent with past research (Chandler, 1962; Blau & Schoenherr, 1971), we define 
restructuring as involving change in the core principles of organizational structure, i.e. change in 
number of layers (vertical restructuring) or number and type of structural axes (horizontal 
restructuring) that affect the whole company (corporate level). Our measure of restructuring 
relies on annual report data, as in Romanelli and Tushman (1994) and Barkema and Schijven 
(2008). Following Romanelli and Tushman (1994), we computed a structural change ratio based 
on senior executive title changes. Romanelli and Tushman (1994) found a high level of 
correspondence between their ratio and more qualitative measures of restructuring. 
To create our structural change ratio, we coded all top managerial titles into categories to 
reflect the horizontal principles of structure: business area; geography; functional; customers; 
and technology. CEO, President and COO titles were coded General Managers. Likewise, we 
coded all titles to a maximum of four levels: Level 1 is the CEO level; Level 2 is the COO or 
President, if present; Levels 3 and 4 are operational (e.g., a business unit, a geography, etc.) and 
functional (e.g. marketing, finance, etc.). Consistent with findings that many COOs are appointed 
to prepare them for promotion to CEO (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004), we excluded heir-apparent 
COOs in order to avoid inflating the structural change ratio. 
 The three steps for calculating the change ratio can be illustrated byFord’s restructuring 
in 1999, when the company introduced a geographic axis to its structure (see Figure 1). First, we 
computed for each firm and year the proportion of titles in each category by dividing the number 
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in each category by the total number of titles coded. Since each title is counted twice, once for 
the horizontal dimension and once for the vertical dimension of structure, we divided each 
proportion by two to obtain a sum of proportions adding to 1 (or 100 percent), a figure easier to 
grasp. In the Ford example, the number of geographic titles increased from zero in 1998 to three 
in 1999: the proportion in this category (after dividing by two) became 0.14. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of business area titles dropped from 0.17 to 0.045. Next we subtracted the value of 
each title category from its corresponding value in the previous year, taking the absolute value 
difference. Finally, we obtained the structural change ratio by summing each difference for a 
given firm-year.  The sum of all the various differences gives Ford a 1999 structural change ratio 
of 0.63. In our dataset, the change ratio varies between 0 and 0.97.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 In order to focus on discontinuous change, we established a threshold excluding minor 
changes. As in Romanelli and Tushman (1994), we converted the structural change ratio into a 
dummy variable “restructuring,” coded 1 above a 0.30 cut-off. In establishing this cut-off, we 
were guided by both interview and documentary sources. We interviewed fourteen senior 
executives at twelve of our firms regarding all changes above 0.20 on our ratio; for two more 
firms we interviewed the client partners of a large international consulting company. Our 
interviewees confirmed all changes above 0.30 as restructurings, but were more ambivalent 
about those below: these often reflected simple reconfigurations or ad hominen changes. In 
Ford’s case, a vice president explained:  'while the 1995 reorganization was a centralizing move 
that reduced the role of the regions, in 1999, top management decided that it was better to give 
some autonomy to the regions again. They said the company was becoming too bureaucratic.' 
We also read all sampled companies' annual reports for mentions of significant structural change, 
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and searched the Lexis-Nexis database, using the key terms 'restructuring', 'reorganizations', 
'appointments' and 'executive moves'.  In Ford’s case, CEO Nasser wrote in Ford's 1999 annual 
report (p.9): 'We’ve taken the next evolutionary step in organization structure and realigned our 
worldwide operations into Consumer Business Groups centered around regions.'  Dicken (2003: 
379)  described Ford’s 1999 change as ’yet another major reorganization of its global 
management structure’. Accordingly we coded as 1 the restructuring variable for Ford in 1999. 
Changes below 0.30 were not as clearly transformative of corporate structure. For 
example, in 2003, Ford’s change ratio was 0.24 due to the addition of two functional titles to the 
two existing ones, and the recombination of Latin American and North American operations into 
a new Americas Group. These changes reinforced the existing structure rather than transformed 
it. Secondary material did not indicate substantial restructuring either. Accordingly, Ford's 2003 
restructuring variable was coded 0. While both interview and documentary material tend to 
confirm the 0.30 cut-off, our robustness checks will include variations around that level. 
 
Explanatory variables 
In measuring reconfigurations, we count additions, mergers, transfers, splits and deletions of 
organizational units (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Karim, 2006). Reflecting the diversity of our 
firms, we use a wide range of data-sources, including annual reports, SEC 10Ks and press 
announcements from the Lexis-Nexis database (under the standard key terms 'reorganization’, 
‘restructuring’, ‘appointments’, ‘executive moves’, ‘mergers and acquisitions’, ‘demergers’ and 
‘spin-offs’). Where two or more units are involved, we count the process as a single 
reconfiguration. Thus Ford’s 2003 merger of its Latin American and North American operations 
into a new Americas Group counts as one reconfiguration.  Other examples of reconfigurations 
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include Ford’s creation of the Automotive Consumer Services division in its North American 
Group in 2000 (addition); Ford’s transfer of its Direct Market business into its Automotive 
Operations division in 1987; its 1996 split of the Automotive Components division from its 
Automotive Operations division to form a stand-alone division; and its 1992 closure of the 
Diversified Products Group (deletion). 
Reconfigurations and restructurings are normally distinct.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
distinctiveness of the two types of change by comparing Ford’s peaks of reconfigurations and 
restructurings between 1985 and 2004. Restructurings are sometimes associated with high levels 
of reconfiguration (1995 and 1999) as the dotted lines show, and sometimes with low level of 
reconfigurations (zero in 1993 and 2001). Conversely, Ford had several peaks of reconfiguration 
(notably 1996 and 2003) that were not associated with simultaneous restructurings. Ford's 
experience confirms that restructurings are not simply intense episodes of reconfiguration. Our 
interest is specifically in the relationship between reconfigurations as types of incremental 
change and restructurings as types of discontinuous change.  Since the reconfigurations that 
occur in the same year as restructurings, i.e. those indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 2, are 
parts of discontinuous change, we exclude them from our analysis.  
[Figure 2 here] 
To test the effect of accumulated reconfigurations over time on organizational 
restructuring, we sum the annual number of reconfigurations between two occurrences of 
restructuring, resetting the cumulative count to zero after each new restructuring. To test the 
impact of discrete perturbations on organizational restructuring, we examine the amount of 
reconfigurations in a single year, identifying relatively intense bursts of activity. Because we 
 16 
have little theoretical guidance on the likely delay between a discrete perturbation and its 
outcome, we tested a range of lags up to four years before a restructuring. 
 We operationalize the hypotheses related to disequilibrium in the following ways. With 
regard to organizational decline, we focus on consecutive absolute performance declines. Past 
research highlights the pressures for structural change exerted by prolonged absolute 
performance decline, rather than decline versus industry (Donaldson, 1987): poor performance 
and the consequent squeeze on resources will increase the perceived need for discontinuous 
change whether or not it is shared by peers. To capture the multi-dimensional nature of economic 
performance, we retain two accounting based measures (Return on Assets and sales) and one 
stock-market based measure (Tobin’s q), in each case using the standard formulae of the strategy 
literature (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Kor & Mahoney, 2005). We compute a moving percentage 
change of the ROA/Sales/Tobin’s q value between two consecutive years. To test the gradual 
accumulation effect in the context of decline (H2a), we count the number of ROA, Sales or 
Tobin’s q declines between two restructurings, resetting the clock to zero after each new 
restructuring: these measures range from 0 to 12. To test the discrete perturbation effect in the 
context of decline (H2b), we count the consecutive number of years of ROA, Sales or Tobin’s q 
decline over four years; these measures range from 0 to 4. Both measures aim to capture the 
effect of prolonged performance declines. The data for these ratios are all from Compustat.  
 With regard to Hypotheses 3a and 3b on the disequilibriating impact of top management 
instability, particularly from outsiders, we focus on the appointment of an external CEO (Miller, 
1993). External CEO change is a dummy variable, coded 1 when the new CEO does not come 
from the company (Karaevli, 2007). To test H3a, we use a one-year lag of external CEO change 
so that interactions correspond with the last year of accumulated incremental change. Since 
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theory is less explicit on timing in the perturbation process (H3b), we tried multiple lags of the 
measure. The data come from annual reports. 
Finally, with regard to Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we measure strategic interconnectedness, 
by the extent of related diversification (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). We measure related 
diversification using an entropy index (Palepu, 1985) based on a firm’s dispersion of sales across 
four-digit industry SIC codes (the less dispersed a firm’s four-digit SIC codes across higher-level 
two-digit SIC codes, the more related-diversified a firm is held to be, with more interdependence 
across business divisions). To test H4a, we use a one-year lag of strategic interconnectedness so 
that interactions correspond with the last year of accumulated incremental change. For H4b, due 
to the lack of theoretical guidance on the timing of the relationship, we again tried multiple lags 
of the measure. The data are from the Compustat Business-Segment Reports.  
 
Control variables 
Our control variables all rely on Compustat data unless otherwise indicated. First, to control for 
momentum effects in restructuring (Amburgey and Miner, 1992), we introduce a one year-lagged 
measure of restructuring. To control for the effects of environmental dynamism on the pace of 
structural changes (McKinley and Scherer, 2000), we use a one-year lag of Dess and Beard's 
(1984) industry-based ‘environmental dynamism’ measure. Dynamism is the volatility of the rate 
of change of annual industry sales, i.e. the standard error of the rate of change of annual industry 
sales at the four-digit SIC code level for each of the 60 primary industries present in the sample.  
We control for two types of strategy change. First, one year-lagged diversification change 
follows Chandler’s (1962) classic explanation of structural change. Diversification change in t -1 
is the absolute percentage change of the total diversification measure (the entropy measure 
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described above) between t -2 and t -1 (Wiersema, 1992). Second, we include one year-lagged 
multinationality change as also likely to affect organizational restructuring (Stopford & Wells, 
1972). Multinationality is measured yearly as a firm’s ratio of foreign sales over total sales 
(FSTS) (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Multinationality change in t -1 is the absolute percentage 
change of the FSTS ratio between t -2 and t -1.   
Consistent with contingency theory, we also control for changing size using the absolute 
percentage change in the number of employees between t -2 and t -1 (Cullen, Anderson, & 
Baker, 1986).  We also control for absolute size (log transformed number of employees lagged 
by one year) reflecting the inhibiting effect that size may have on the propensity to change 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Finally, we include a one-year lag of performance change (using the 
moving percentage change measures described above) and, to allow for exogenous shocks, we 
include time dummies (year).  
 
Analysis 
We use dynamic panel data analysis conducted with STATA 11. This technique is appropriate 
for analyzing a dataset composed of the same firms observed at multiple points in time as it can 
correct for the risks of autocorrelation between the error terms of the different variables over 
time (Wooldridge, 2002: 448). For long panels such as ours, liable to unobserved heterogeneity 
(firm effects) and endogeneity associated with state dependence (presence of a lag of the 
dependent variable) and initial conditions (restructurings immediately prior to our panel period), 
Wooldridge (2005) proposes correlated random-effect probit. This dynamic panel data 
estimation for categorical dependent variables models the distribution of the unobserved effect in 
function of the value of initial conditions. Wooldridge’s estimator computes the longitudinally-
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averaged exogenous variables for each firm then enters these as additional regressors in the 
‘xtprobit’ specifications. We set 1989 as the year for initial value conditions, introducing the 
variable “restructuring 1989” in the model, because we test the perturbation effect up to four 
years before a restructuring event. As a result we focus on a 16-year time window that yields 644 
firm-year observations for the test of reconfiguration bursts, and 555 for the test of cumulated 
reconfigurations.  Two firms, taken over before 1989, leave the sample. Our model is: 
              !! !"#$!%&$%!'()!" = 1! !"#$!%&$%!'()!,!!!, !"#$!%&$%!'()!!, !!" ,!!) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!= ! ! !!!" + !!!!,!,!!! + !!! + !!!!!! , ! = 1,… ,!   
Where t = 1 corresponds to 1990, t = T corresponds to 2004; restructuringi 0 corresponds to the 
initial value conditions (events that took place in 1989); xit is a vector of strictly exogenous 
independent variables; αi are the time-persistent unobserved individual effects. The parameter 
vectors to be estimated are β for the exogenous independent variables and their longitudinal 
averages; γ for the two endogenous variables (restructuring in 1989 and restructuring in t-1), νt 
for unrestricted year intercepts; and ρα for the unobserved effect. φ denotes the distribution 
function.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 describes the sampled firms’ size, age, sales and strategies. The average firm restructures 
once every 6 years (an average 0.156 per firm-year). The maximum number of restructurings for 
any firm over their presence in the sample was five (as at DuPont, Digital Equipment, and 
Xerox).  On the other hand, firms reconfigure much more frequently with an average of 3.182 
reconfigurations per firm-year. The maximum number of reconfigurations in a year was 17 
(Allied Signal/Honeywell International in 2003).   
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[Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum values, and 
correlations between variables. Restructuring is positively correlated with diversification change 
(r = 0.09, p < 0.05), and with changing size in the preceding year (r = 0.11, p < 0.001). 
Restructuring is negatively correlated with the cumulated number of reconfigurations between 
two restructuring occurrences (r = -0.10, p < 0.05), the number of cumulated Tobin’s q declines 
between two restructurings (r = -0.09, p < 0.05), and restructuring in the previous year (r = -0.14, 
p < 0.001). The only high level of correlation between the independent variables simultaneously 
present in the models we report below is that between the cumulated count of reconfigurations 
and the cumulated number of Tobin’s q declines between two restructurings (r = 0.75, p < 
0.001). We deal with the resulting potential issue of multicollinearity below.  
  [Table 2 here] 
Results 
In Table 3, Models 1 and 2 test Hypothesis 1a by assessing the effect of cumulated 
reconfigurations between two occurrences of restructuring on organizational restructuring. 
Hypothesis 1a is not supported in either of the models (β = - 0.143, p > 0.10 in M1 and β = -
0.313, p > 0.10 in M2). Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests show Model 1 significantly improves on a 
null model (unreported) containing only the constant and the time dummy variables (Chi2 
statistic = 70.17, p < 0.01) and the full Model 2 improves on the nested Model 1 (Chi2 statistic = 
19.90, p < 0.01). Given the high correlation between ‘Cumulated reconfigurations since previous 
restructuring’ and ‘Cumulated Tobin’s q declines since previous restructuring,’ we also ran 
Models 1 without the latter and Model 2 without the latter and its corresponding interaction. The 
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coefficient of ‘Cumulated reconfigurations since previous restructuring’ stayed insignificant. 
This variable’s true value is not affected by multicollinearity.  
Models 3 and 4 test Hypothesis 1b regarding the perturbation process, using different lags 
of reconfiguration intensity.1 Model 3 shows that the greater the amount of reconfigurations in a 
given year, the greater and more significant the likelihood of a firm undergoing a restructuring 
three years later (β = 0.183, p < 0.05). This result is even stronger in Model 4 (β = 0.239, p < 
0.01). Moreover, in this model, restructuring also responds to bursts of reconfiguration two and 
four years earlier, although the significance of these effects is weaker (β = 0.126, p < 0.10 and β 
= 0.129, p < 0.10 respectively). A first LR test shows these two models significantly improve on 
a null model (unreported) which contains only the constant and the time dummy variables. A 
second LR test shows Model 4 significantly improves on the nested Model 3. Models 3 and 4 are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1b regarding perturbation, i.e. Lorenz’s (1993) butterfly effect.  It is 
concentrated bursts of incremental change that trigger subsequent discontinuous change, rather 
than accumulation. The most-highly significant length of time between trigger and outcome is 
three years, half the time between restructuring events ordinarily. 
We note also that this triggering effect holds after controlling for several factors. In 
Models 3 and 4, the one-year lagged degree of environmental dynamism significantly decreases 
the likelihood of a restructuring, which suggests that the more dynamic the environment, the 
more managers avoid discontinuous change. But in line with contingency theory, the 
restructuring likelihood significantly increases with diversification change and size change. As 
expected, an increase of ROA (in Models 3 and 4) and Tobin’s q (in Model 3) in the previous 
year decreases the likelihood of restructuring (the coefficients of the two later performance 
measures are significant at the 10% level only).  State dependence also plays a strong role (firms 
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are significantly less likely to restructure when they already have restructured in the previous 
year, β = -1.260, p < 0.001 in Model 4) along with initial conditions (the restructuring in 1989 
variable is weakly significant at the 10% level and its coefficient is negative). The ρ coefficient 
which indicates the percentage of the composite effect due to the unobserved firm effects (the αi 
in our model) is reassuringly very small.2  
 [Table 3 here] 
 We now examine the role of organizational disequilibrium in the escalation of change. 
While our organizations are not ordinarily sensitive to accumulation, accumulation does tend to 
play a role in some disequilibrium conditions. With regard to the moderating effect of 
performance decline, H2a is supported for Tobin’s q decline but not for sales or ROA decline. In 
Models 1 and 2, the coefficient of cumulated Tobin’s q declines since the previous restructuring 
is positive and significant and so is its interaction term with cumulated reconfigurations in Model 
2 (β = 0.540, p < 0.001). H2b is supported for sales decline, though not for ROA or Tobin’s q 
decline. We find restructuring is significantly more likely three years after a burst of 
reconfigurations when coinciding with up to four consecutive years of sales decline. In Model 4, 
consistent with the hypothesis, the interaction term is positive and highly significant (β = 0.299, 
p < 0.001). In conditions of disequilibrium associated with prolonged performance decline, 
organizations are sensitive to both accumulation and perturbation effects.  
 There is weak support for H3a and H3b examining the disequilibrium following the 
appointment of new externally-appointed CEOs. In Models 2 and 4, even though the main effect 
seems to show that new external CEOs in general reduce the likelihood of restructuring in the 
following year (β = -1.127, p < 0.10 and β = -1.076, p < 0.10 respectively), the interaction terms 
between cumulated reconfigurations, reconfiguration intensity in t-1 and new externally-
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appointed CEO in t-1 are positive and weakly significant (β = 1.973, p < 0.10 and β = 0.637, p < 
0.10 respectively). Organizations are sensitive to change in leadership; the latter plays a role in 
both the progressive accumulation and the perturbation effects. For the perturbation effect, the 
escalation process seems to be hastened from three years (the most significant lag) in the general 
case to one.  
 On the other hand, Hypotheses H4a and H4b on the moderating effect of strategic 
interconnectedness are not supported.3 In Models 1 and 2, although the main terms of strategic 
interconnectedness are positive and significant at the five percent level, the interaction is not 
significant. In Models 3 and 4, although the coefficients of lagged reconfiguration intensity three 
years earlier are consistently positive and significant, the strategic interconnectedness variable is 
not significant and neither is the interaction term in Model 4. These results suggest that 
interconnections in human organizations may not have the same escalating consequences in 
organizational systems as in natural systems.  
We conclude by assessing the direct effects of increasingly intense bursts of 
reconfigurations (perturbations) on the likelihood of subsequent restructuring. With correlated 
random effects probit estimations, the size of regression coefficients does not indicate the real 
impact of each variable because it does not consider the other variables’ simultaneous effects. 
We interpret the regression coefficients by computing the partial effects on mean coefficients, 
averaged across the distribution of unobservables (Wooldridge, 2005). Figure 3 plots the 
cumulated probability distribution of restructuring as a function of the annual number of 
reconfigurations three years earlier conditional upon the average partial effect of the other 
significant variables in Model 4. We use the real scale of reconfigurations in t-3 to make 
managerial implications more straightforward  
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Figure 3 shows an unevenly rising effect of annual incremental change (reconfiguration 
intensity) on the likelihood of subsequent discontinuous change (restructuring). At three 
reconfigurations a year (close to the mean rate of reconfiguration, represented by the vertical line 
in Figure 3), the estimated probability of restructuring three years later is a modest 0.30. But a 
doubling of this rate to six raises the probability of subsequent restructuring to 0.58. Six is thus 
the threshold where a subsequent restructuring becomes more likely than not. The probability 
remains at this level at seven and eight reconfigurations, but a further critical point is reached at 
nine reconfigurations, where the likelihood of escalation jumps to 0.72. For intense bursts of 
twelve reconfigurations, the probability is 0.82: restructuring is hard to avoid.  
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we drew on complex adaptive systems theory to investigate the relationship 
between two types of change, incremental and discontinuous. Above all, our findings confirm the 
proposition derived from complex adaptive systems theory that one type of change can lead to 
another (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Following various simulations 
(Carroll & Burton, 2000; Davis et al., 2009) and case studies (Chiles et al., 2004; Burgelman & 
Grove, 2007; Plowman et al., 2007), we provide for the first time large-sample support for the 
relevance of complex adaptive systems theory for viewing change in organizational as well as 
natural systems.  Incremental change and discontinuous change are not simply discrete, well-
insulated processes. Incremental change enters as a causal factor in discontinuous change in its 
own right, even controlling for established factors such as strategy change (Chandler, 1962) and 
size change (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971).   
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   We have further drawn on complex adaptive systems theory as a metaphorical framework 
(Richardson, 2011) by which to interpret this kind of nonlinear escalation. In particular, complex 
adaptive systems theory has helped us build propositions about the processes by which change 
might escalate and the conditions in which this is more likely.  In terms of processes, we find that 
organizations are sensitive to something like the butterfly effect (Lorenz, 1993), with discrete 
perturbations leading eventually to discontinuous change. This holds whether or not the 
organization is already in disequilbrium. On the other hand, we suggest a boundary condition for 
susceptibility to sudden sand-pile avalanches following the progressive accumulation of 
incremental change (Bak and Paczuski, 1995). Accumulated incremental change is only likely to 
trigger discontinuous change in conditions of disequilibrium. Ordinarily, then, it is bursts of 
change that are more likely to lead directly to escalation. Doubling the annual rate of 
reconfiguration from three (close to the mean) to six increases the likelihood of subsequent 
restructuring from less than a third to substantially over a half. Although we cannot access 
directly the precise internal mechanisms of this perturbation process, we can interpret it in terms 
of earlier studies. The lag between intense bursts of incremental change and subsequent 
discontinuous change – most significantly, a three year gap - fits with both the opening of 
mindsets at Branson (Chiles et al., 2004) and the two-step process at Intel (Burgelman and 
Grove, 2007). In the light of these studies, we speculate that bursts of reconfiguration may loosen 
up mindsets and prepare managers for greater change. But still it seems to take time to gather and 
accept the evidence that even intensive bursts of reconfiguration are insufficient as forms of 
change. Only once the evidence is clear and overwhelming do managers appear to take decisive 
action in the form of restructuring. 
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 Complex adaptive systems theory points also to various possible moderating effects on 
change escalation. In particular, heightened organizational disequilibrium may provide 
particularly sensitive conditions for undertaking large amounts of incremental change. Relevant 
disequilibrium conditions include downturns in growth (Huber et al., 1995) and (more weakly) 
new external CEOs  (Miller, 1993). On the other hand, we do not find support for the role of 
interconnectedness, suggested by complex adaptive systems theory and indeed by organizational 
configuration and complementarity theories (Miller, 1982; Zenger, 2002). Strategically 
interconnected organizations appear just as able to absorb incremental change as more loosely-
coupled organizations. In respect to reconfigurations at least, interconnections do not seem likely 
to amplify the repercussions of incremental change throughout the organization as a whole. 
 The robustness of strategically-interconnected systems and the ability of organizations 
ordinarily to absorb cumulative incremental change may indicate some limits to the transfer of 
complex adaptive systems theory into the context of human organizations. First, unlike natural 
systems, organizations are typically designed at least partly through conscious managerial 
intervention. An interpretation of the equivalent levels of robustness we find across degrees of 
strategic interconnectedness in our sample is that, in general, managers may be constructing for 
themselves organizations that they know they can normally manage. In building connectedness, 
they appear to avoid levels that increase their vulnerability to nonlinear change. It is heightened 
disequilibrium, not organization design, which renders organizations likely to tip over the edge 
of chaos. Second, these organizations’ non-responsiveness in the face of steadily accumulating 
incremental change suggests a degree of organizational robustness. It seems that managers can 
ordinarily cope with moderate levels of incremental change over time; their organizations are 
pushed to discontinuous change only when accumulated incremental change is combined with 
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disequilibrium or when exposed to intense bursts of incremental change. The insignificant effects 
of both interconnectedness and ordinary accumulation are consistent with a view of managers as, 
generally, effective designers and copers.  As MacClean and MacIntosh (2011) have suggested, 
in transferring complex adaptive systems theory from natural to human organizations, we should 
attend to the intervening role of management.  
 Our findings have implications for other streams of organization theory, especially for 
momentum approaches to change (e.g. Amburgey and Miner, 1992) and views of incremental 
change as an organizational routine (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999). First, by contrast to Kelly and 
Amburgey (1991), we find that one kind of change can unfreeze another. Momentum approaches 
to change should therefore be sensitive not only to repetition of the same routine but to escalation 
to another level. Second, the potential for escalation qualifies the value of incremental change as 
an organizational routine.  Contrary to Ilinitch et al (1996), incremental change may not 
substitute for discontinuous change, but cause it. Here it is important to recognize that the 
routines produced by the repetition of incremental change (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999) are not 
necessarily relevant to the discontinuous changes that can result. Weick and Quinn (1999) warn 
that different types of change can have very different managerial implications: in discontinuous 
change, change agents are ‘prime-movers’; in incremental change, they are ‘sense-makers’. An 
organization satisfied with its well-honed routines for incremental change may be ill-prepared for 
escalation to discontinuous change.  Given the rising probabilities we identified earlier, managers 
may need to be particularly aware that suddenly intensifying the rate of incremental change in a 
particular year is likely to set off a quite different kind of change some years later. 
    We underline several limitations of this study. While we do bring a large sample to the 
question of nonlinear change, we are not able to investigate directly the detailed processes by 
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which it happens. For example, we extrapolate from qualitative studies (Chiles et al, 2004; 
Burgelman and Grove, 2007) to illuminate the lagged process between initial perturbation and 
eventual restructuring. Secondly, we have considered only nonlinear change in organizational 
structure, from reconfiguration to restructuring. It is possible that other dimensions of 
organizations that are less amenable to deliberate managerial control, for example organizational 
culture, may be subject to different processes of escalation. A third limitation is the unexamined 
nature of the performance implications of nonlinear change. Prior case studies have tended to 
emphasize benefits, with incremental change easing the transition to more radical change (Chiles 
et al., 2004; Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Plowman et al., 2007). However, the performance 
effects of restructurings specifically are generally more equivocal (Bowman et al, 1999). Our 
results suggest that reconfigurations can prompt restructurings even when controlling for strategy 
and size change. In this sense, incremental change could be triggering superfluous change.  We 
urge more research into the performance consequences of discontinuous changes consequent 
upon bursts of incremental change. 
 In sum, this study advances our understanding of the extent of escalation towards 
discontinuous change, the processes of such escalation and the conditions when this escalation is 
more likely. We provide for the first time large-sample evidence for the importance of nonlinear 
change in organizations, in line with the propositions of earlier theorists drawing on complex 
adaptive systems theory (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Weick and Quinn, 1999). Moreover, we 
develop from complex adaptive systems theory alternative processes of change escalation, and 
confirm the general relevance of perturbation (or butterfly) effects and the more limited 
relevance of accumulation (or sand-pile) effects.  We also draw on complex systems theory in 
order to identify relevant disequilibrium conditions in organizations. Our findings warn 
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organizations to moderate the pace of incremental change, in the form of reconfigurations, if they 
wish to avoid discontinuous change, in the form of restructurings, particularly in conditions of 
heightened disequilibrium. If they cannot moderate this pace, then organizations should prepare 
for the distinctive challenges of discontinuous change. However, we also qualify the relevance of 
complex adaptive systems theory to organizations.  Interconnectedness and the progressive 
accumulation of change do not apparently increase the likelihood of discontinuous change in the 
same way as in natural systems. In organizational systems, researchers adopting the complex 
adaptive systems lens should be sensitive to the potential role of managers in the design of 
organizations and the absorption of ordinary change.  
 
Endnotes 
1 We also run a single model containing all variables to test all hypotheses with accumulation 
and perturbation effects simultaneously. But this model suffered from multicollinearity caused in 
large part by the high correlations between the measure of cumulated reconfigurations and the 
lags of reconfiguration. While we would have preferred to report one single model, the results 
we report are more robust and unaffected by multicollinearity. 
 
2 We conducted a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results around the 0.30 cut-
off point for restructuring. We tested the models by counting as restructuring changes superior or 
equal to 0.27 and superior or equal to 0.33, i.e. 10% below and 10% above the 0.30 cut-off point. 
In the former case, our count increased by 24% with 32 additional events. In the latter case, our 
count decreased by 17% with 23 fewer events. At both cut-offs, we found consistent results with 
those discussed earlier. Thus, our results for Hypotheses 1a and 1b are consistent across a range 
of 85 to 140 events.  
 
3 As regards the effect of disequilibrium and strategic interconnectedness associated with the 
perturbation process, we ran a model which contained all the lags of the main terms and a model 
including the latter and their corresponding interactions. But we ran into two sorts of issues: 
multicollinearity and an excessively high number of degrees of freedom relative to N.  We 
choose to present the models 3 and 4 with lags that optimize the degrees of freedom relative to 
N, avoid multicollinearity and best minimize the log likelihood.
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Figure 1 – Ford’s 1999 Restructuring 
 
Ford’s structure in 1998 
 
 
 
Ford’s structure in 1999 
 
 
 
Restructuring in 1999 (change ratio > 0.30) 
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Figure 2 – Restructurings and reconfigurations at Ford between 1985 and 2004 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Interpretation of the perturbation effect (Model 4 with average partial effects 
and selected values of reconfiguration intensity) 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for Fortune 50 firms over 1989-2004 time window 
 
 Min Max Mean 
Restructuring 0 1 0.156 
Reconfigurations 0 17 3.182 
# of employees 6,590 775,100 108,685 
Total sales  $3.6bn $263.9bn $33.2bn 
Total assets $2.6bn $750.3bn $43.8bn 
Age 13 132 81 
Total diversification  0 2.28 0.93 
Related diversification 0 1.72 0.341 
Multinationality (foreign sales over total sales) 0% 80% 33.7% 
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Table 2- Bivariate correlation matrix 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.Restructuring 0.156 0.363 0 1 1.00             2.Cumulated reconfig(a). 0.032 1.016 -.936 6.530 -0.10 1.00            
3. Reconfig.intensity t-1(a) -.016 0.980 -.993 4.020 0.01 0.49 1.00           
4. Reconfig.intensity t-2(a)  -.012 0.971 -.993 4.020 -0.02 0.44 0.23 1.00          
5. Reconfig.intensity t -3(a) 0.016 1.000 -.993 4.020 0.03 0.33 0.25 0.21 1.00         
6. Reconfig intensity t-4(a) 0.007 0.994 -.993 4.020 -0.03 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.21 1.00        
7.Cumulated Tobin's Q 
decline since pv. restrg (a) 0.026 1.017 -.982 4.560 -0.09 0.75 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.06 1.00       
8. Consecutive sales 
declines t - 4 to t -7(a) -.009 1.022 -1.16 2.865 -.002 -.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.14 1.00      
9. New outsider CEO t-1 0.033 0.178 0 1 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -.02 1.00     
10. Strat. interconnect.t-1(a) 0.081 1.056 -.830 3.839 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 -0.18 -.11 0.02 1.00    
11. Strat. interconnect t-3(a) 0.047 1.026 -.830 3.812 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.16 -.08 0.01 0.90 1.00   
12. Restructuring 1989 0.187 0.390 0 1 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.09 -.16 -.16 1.00  
13. Restructuring t-1 0.162 0.368 0 1 -0.14 -.36 -0.43 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.37 -.02 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.03 1.00 
14. Envt dynamism t-1 0.034 0.030 0.001 0.346 -0.07 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.04 -.01 0.03 -.00 -.01 0.04 
15. Diversif. change  t-1 0.077 0.142 0.000 1.710 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.06 -.03 -.01 0.03 
16. Multinat. change t -1 0.022 0.028 0.000 0.255 0.01 -.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.10 0.06 -.01 -.02 0.01 0.01 
17.Size change t -1(a) 0.001 1.107 -.504 19.563 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 -.06 0.02 
18. ROA variation t -1 (a) -.019 1.082 -16.7 8.925 -0.04 -.00 -0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
19. Sales variation t -1 0.052 0.163 -.823 1.103 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -.04 -.01 0.00 -.09 -0.02 
20 Tobin's q variation t -1 0.043 0.217 -.584 1.526 -0.04 -.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 -.04 -0.04 
21. Size t -1 (log) (a) -.031 1.026 -2.86 2.868 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.08 -.30 0.04 0.20 0.18 -.02 0.03 
        
 
        Table 3 (continued) 
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
14. Envt dynamism t-1 1.00        
15. Diversif. change  t-1 0.13 1.00       
16. Multinationality change t -1 0.03 0.16 1.00      
17.Size change t -1(a) -0.06 0.17 0.13 1.00     
18. ROA variation t -1 (a) 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.00 1.00    
19. Sales variation t -1 -0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.00 0.05 1.00   
20 Tobin's q variation t -1 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.04 1.00  
21. Size t -1 (log) (a) -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 0.29 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 1.00 
(a) Standardized variables. Correlations in italic are significant at 5% level; correlations in bold are significant at 0.01% level and above. 
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Table 3–Impact of incremental change (reconfigurations) on discontinuous change 
(restructuring) - Binary dynamic panel data (random effect correlated probit) 
 
Variables M1 M2 M3  M4 
 Accumulation process Perturbation process 
Main Effects      
Cumulated reconfigurations since previous 
restructuring (a) 
-0.143 (0.233) -0.313 (0.271)   
Reconfiguration intensity in t -1 (a)   -0.109 (0.095) -0.082 (0.102) 
Reconfiguration intensity in t -2 (a)   0.086 (0.085)     0.126 (0.088) + 
Reconfiguration intensity in t -3 (a)      0.183 (0.083) *     0.239 (0.088) ** 
Reconfiguration intensity in t -4 (a)    0.086 (0.084)     0.129 (0.088) + 
Cumulated Tobin’s q declines since previous 
restructuring (a) 
   0.379 (0.204) *   0.367 (0.217) *   
Consecutive sales declines in t -4 to -7 (a)      0.009 (0.098) 0.014 (0.103) 
New outsider CEO in t -1  -0.516 (0.564) -1.127 (0.897) +  -0.577 (0.532)    -1.076 (0.900) + 
Level of strategic interconnectedness in t-1 (a)     0.357 (0.171) *   0.443 (0.182) *   
Level of strategic interconnectedness in t -3 (a)   -0.051 (0.159) -0.083 (0.171) 
Interactions     
Cum. reconf. since previous restrg x Cum. 
Tobin’s q declines since previous restrg (a) 
     0.540 (0.161) ***   
Reconfiguration intensity in t-3 x Consecutive 
sales declines in t -4 to -7 (a) 
          0.299 (0.088) *** 
Cum. reconfigurations since previous restrg (a) 
x New outsider CEO in t-1 
    1.973 (0.944) +   
Reconfiguration intensity in t-1 (a) x New 
outsider CEO in t -1  
        0.637 (0.424) + 
Cum. reconf. since previous restrg x Level of 
strategic interconnectedness in t-1 (a) 
 -0.106 (0.147)   
Reconfiguration intensity in t-3 x Level of 
strategic interconnectedness in t-3 (a) 
      -0.013 (0.077) 
Control variables     
Restructuring 1989  -0.000 (0.272) -0.033 (0.288)       -0.331 (0.226) +       -0.336 (0.265) + 
Restructuring in t -1      -1.164 (0.299) ***      -1.487 (0.320) ***        -1.184 (0.286) ***        -1.260 (0.300) *** 
Environment dynamism in t -1    -9.156 (4.848) *     -6.948 (4.986) +       -8.551 (4.028) *      -10.212 (4.292) * 
Diversification change in t -1   0.315 (0.606) -0.122 (0.740)        1.101 (0.497) *       1.115 (0.514) * 
Multinationality change in t -1 -1.481 (2.933) -0.923 (3.016)    -2.760 (2.659)     -1.430 (2.732) 
Size change in t -1 (a)      0.154 (0.081) *     0.145 (0.079) *        0.147 (0.076) *         0.140 (0.081) * 
ROA variation in t -1 (a)    -0.087 (0.072)     -0.144 (0.082) *        -0.081 (0.054) +        -0.079 (0.055) + 
Sales variation in t-1    0.511 (0.501)     0.817 (0.511) +       0.116 (0.465)      0.038 (0.481) 
Tobin’s q variation in t-1  -0.091 (0.456)  -0.175 (0.479)        -0.534 (0.391) +     -0.438 (0.388)  
Size in y -1 (log transf.) (a)   -0.097 (0.313) -0.011 (0.327)     0.031 (0.252)      -0.034 (0.258) 
Constant      -1.580 (0.546) **     -1.488 (0.578) **         -1.476 (0.506) ***         -1.856 (0.560) *** 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
ρ        0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)        0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
N (b) 555 555 644 644 
Log Likelihood -167.93 -157.98 -233.97 -223.84 
Chi2 statistic for model significance (d.f.) (c)      70.17 ** (40)      74.89 ** (46)         63.66 * (46)       74.30 * (52) 
Chi2 statistic for significance of interactions 
(d.f.) (d) 
    19.90 ** (6)       20.26 ** (6) 
McFadden pseudo R2  0.421 0.455 0.194 0.230 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, one-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses.  
(a) Standardized variable. (b) The difference in sample sizes is caused by a reduced number of observations when one 
cumulates the number of reconfigurations between two occurrences of restructuring. In some cases, the first observed 
restructuring takes place much later than the start of our time window. For instance, Conagra’s first and only 
restructuring took place in 2002. Since we cannot cumulate the number of reconfigurations until then, we are losing all 
the preceding observations. (c) Test of the model against the model that includes only the constant and the time dummy 
variables. (d) Test of the model against the partial model that excludes the three interaction variables. NB: The degrees 
of freedom also include the longitudinally-averaged exogenous variables. 
